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Introduction	
 
Scheduled service in the transit industry is organized around the assignment of vehicles 
and operators.  The assignment of operators to scheduled service runs is typically made for a 
three-month period.  In daily operations, assigned runs can open up as a result of absences, 
quits and terminations, retirements, promotions, in-service training, approved leaves, injuries, 
and personal days off.  This open work is filled from a reserve pool of operators known as the 
extraboard. 
The amount of open work can vary substantially from day to day, as well as seasonally.  
This variation poses challenges to extraboard managers.  When the amount of open work is less 
than expected, there is a surplus of operators available at assigned report times accruing report 
hours (time for which they are being paid but are not in platform service).  When the amount of 
open work is greater than expected, there is a deficit of available operators, resulting in lost 
service (termed “missed pull-outs”).  In practice, operators are also asked to voluntarily work 
their days off when the supply of extraboard operators is exhausted in order to minimize the 
incidence of missed pull-outs. 
The literature on extraboard management generally approaches the coverage of open 
work as a three-stage problem (1, 2, 3).  The first (strategic) stage involves determining the 
optimal size of the extraboard workforce, based on expectations of the amount of open work.  
The time frame of this stage is usually quarterly.  The second (tactical) stage involves allocation 
of extraboard to the transit agency’s garages and subsequent assignment to days of the week, 
again based on expectations of open work.  The time frame of this stage is also typically 
quarterly.  In the final (operational) stage, extraboard operators and regular operators working 
overtime are assigned to open runs, which occurs daily. 
 There are a number of factors that complicate open work planning and management.  
For example, the absence information used in determining the size of the extraboard can be 
affected by work rules, operator demographics, scheduling practices, or a transit agency’s 
unscheduled overtime work policy (4, 5, 6, 7).  The size of the extraboard is also influenced by 
pay premiums and guarantees, the cost of fringe benefits, and limitations on extraboard 
managers’ ability to combine or break up pieces of open work (8).  These complications make 
it difficult for transit executives to assess the extent to which the balance between the cost of 
work filled by the extraboard and the benefits to customers from otherwise lost service 
represents the best use of agency resources. 
This paper examines bus extraboard operations at TriMet, the transit provider for the 
Portland, Oregon metropolitan area.  The analysis draws on daily extraboard data from the agency’s 
three bus garages between 2002 and 2010.  TriMet is a mid-sized transit property; on an average 
weekday in 2010 its bus system served 192,300 boarding riders on 79 routes with 491 peak 
vehicles.  TriMet also provides light rail and streetcar service, which are not covered in this paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly reviews 
the literature addressing factors that influence extraboard performance.  Empirical findings 
from analysis of TriMet’s extraboard operations are then presented.  These findings cover 
multiple levels of analysis, beginning with general performance metrics, proceeding to 
estimating the determinants of open work, and ending with structural estimation of various 
trade-offs associated with daily extraboard operations.  Lastly, the findings and their 
implications are discussed in the concluding section. 
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Factors	Affecting	Extraboard	Performance	
 
Various work rules and benefits affect operator productivity and job performance 
in both the regular and extraboard service environments.  Mundle et al.’s (4) study of 
three large transit agencies found that work rules and benefits collectively required one 
hour and 47 minutes of operator pay time to produce one hour of platform service.  Their 
breakdown of the 47 minutes of “surplus” pay minutes covered three general categories: 
1) work rules (including pay for report time, and premiums for scheduled/unscheduled 
overtime and holiday service), which accounted for 18 additional minutes per platform 
hour of service; 2) operator absences (both scheduled and unscheduled), which accounted 
for 10 additional minutes per platform hour; and 3) fringe benefits (including 
health/dental insurance, worker’s compensation, and free transportation), which 
accounted for 19 additional minutes per platform hour. 
Circumstances have grown more challenging in the years since Mundle et al.’s (4) 
study.  For example, both the incidence and variability of operator absences have 
increased since passage of the Family and Medical leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 (P.L. 103-
3, 107 Stat. 6).  A U.S. Department of Labor report (9) has identified public transit as 
being among the industries most affected by FMLA, particularly its regulations 
associated with unscheduled intermittent leaves.  These regulations effectively allow 
workers to notify their employer of such leaves up to two days after their occurrence.  
Thus, the daily process of managing open work through the extraboard has become more 
uncertain.  Respondents to Volinsky’s (10) transit industry survey characterized FMLA 
as “a nightmare,” “a disaster,” and “a royal pain” that is “killing them” (p. 6). 
Beyond Mundle et al.’s (1990) general productivity assessment and the issues 
affecting operator absenteeism, there is a more specific collection of work rules that can 
affect the performance of the extraboard.  In the present study, these rules are defined by 
the collective bargaining agreement currently in place at TriMet (11).  First, the 
agreement includes a guarantee of eight pay hours daily for those who sign on to the 
extraboard, effectively limiting extraboard participation to full time operators.  This 
makes it more difficult to piece the work of absent mini run and split shift operators into 
a full time run without incurring substantial report time and unscheduled overtime. 
Second, extraboard operators’ daily work is assigned using a revolving system 
known as the “red line.”  Under this system, extraboard operators are sorted by seniority 
and the first piece of work on the first day of a new service period is assigned to the most 
senior operator.  On each subsequent day throughout the period the red line moves 
progressively through the extraboard roster, ensuring that no operator receives a 
consistently “good” or “bad” work assignment. 
There are several negative consequences related to the use of the red line system.  
Despite its nominal fairness, the red line also produces more variable work schedules for 
extraboard operators.  Although some operators consider this variability to be an 
attractive feature of extraboard work, it has been found that work schedule variation also 
contributes to fatigue and greater safety risk (12).  Variable work schedules may also 
conflict with rules on breaks between assignments.  For example, TriMet operators may 
turn down an assignment whose report time is less than nine hours from the time they 
clock out from their previous day’s work.  An assignment that is turned down for this 
 4 
 
reason is known as a “pass-up.”  The daily progression of the red line creates pass-up 
situations.  It should also be noted that pass-up situations occasionally arise in the regular 
duty operator picks. 
The incidence of pass-ups can also be affected by another rule that allows 
operators to trade their work.  The collective bargaining agreement states that trades are 
“critically important for extraboard operators who are unable to predict their workload, 
recovery time and schedules in advance” (Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 1m).  
However, an operator seeking to avoid an early morning report time, for example, may 
trade for that work knowing that it can be passed up when it follows a late evening 
assignment that they prefer. 
Trades are much more common among extraboard than regular duty operators.  In 
2009, 31.8% of the daily work assigned to extraboard operators was traded, while only 
1.2% of the work selected by regular duty operators was traded.  This difference indicates 
that many extraboard operators use trades to obtain assignments at their preferred work 
times, either directly or indirectly (i.e., through pass-ups).  With daily work guaranteed in 
the agreement, the red line may now actually serve as an impediment to matching work 
with operator preferences. 
When a pass-up occurs, the affected operator returns to the extraboard roster for a 
later assignment.  The passed up work will then be filled if another extraboard operator is 
available at the scheduled pullout time.  Anticipating early morning pass-ups and 
unexpected absences, extraboard managers may “overstock” the supply of operators with 
early morning report times, frequently calling in operators to work their regular day off 
(RDO).  Without such an overstock, lost service (missed pullouts) would otherwise 
result.  However, when anticipated pass-ups and unexpected absences do not materialize, 
the surplus operators then accrue report time.  Generally, given that senior management 
seeks to minimize lost service (and closely tracks its occurrence), extraboard managers 
have a strong incentive to maintain an overstock of operators on early morning report. 
 When extraboard operators pass up early morning reports and are shifted to later 
time slots, excess report time also often results later in the day.  In this case, operators 
who are shifted supplement those who were already assigned to cover expected open 
work.  Thus, early morning pass-ups by extraboard operators can produce excess report 
time both early and late in the day. 
The magnitude of excess report time from pass-ups and absence uncertainties is 
large enough to substantially affect the productivity of the extraboard.  Using daily 
garage data from the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), 
Koutsopolous and Wilson (3) developed an optimization tool for determining the number 
of extraboard operators needed by time of report.  Comparing their results with MBTA’s 
actual assignments, the authors found a 20-30% surplus of extraboard hours on report, 
mostly concentrated in the early morning period.  TriMet’s Information Technology (IT) 
Department has developed a similar tool that advises extraboard managers at the end of 
each day on the expected number of operators that will be needed on the next day, by 
time of report.  In practice, TriMet IT staff has observed outcomes similar to those 
reported by Koutsopolous and Wilson (3).  More generally, DeAnnuntis and Morris (13) 
found that most transit agencies employ no planning or optimization tools in managing 
their extraboards. 
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With respect to determining the overall number of extraboard operators needed in 
a given service period, there are oftentimes cost advantages in filling known open straight 
runs with RDO operators.  However, there are two widely held concerns that limit the 
extent to which managers rely on RDO operators to augment the extraboard.  The first 
concern is that such work will lead to greater subsequent absenteeism among RDO 
operators.  Shiftan and Wilson (6) investigated this issue, analyzing MBTA data.  Their 
analysis found no evidence of increased absence following voluntary overtime work.  
The second concern is that the additional overtime may contribute to operator fatigue and 
have negative safety consequences.  Strathman et al. (13) studied this issue using TriMet 
data, finding no significant increase in safety incidents associated with increases in total 
hours worked. 
Common to both absence and safety concerns is the fact that the operator’s 
commitment to such overtime work is voluntary.  In their review of literature on the 
relationship between safety and driver fatigue, DiMilia et al. (15) observe that when 
overtime is voluntarily chosen the safety risk increase that might otherwise materialize 
tends to be mitigated.  Shiftan and Wilson (6) similarly hypothesize that when operators 
self-select into overtime work, they are less likely to subsequently absent themselves 
from work. 
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Empirical	Analysis	
 
Data on extraboard operations were recovered from TriMet’s enterprise data 
warehouse for the period extending from September 1, 2002 to May 5, 2010.  Daily 
records were created for each of TriMet’s three bus garages (Center, Merlo, and Powell), 
resulting in 8,317 total “garage-day” observations.  TriMet began archiving pass-up data 
on December 5, 2004.  The number of garage-day observations from this date to the end 
of the study period totals 5,788.  In the following presentation, data from the 2002-10 
period are used to provide a general profile of extraboard operations, while data from 
2004/5-10 are used in the statistical analysis of extraboard performance. 
A summary of daily work by garage is presented in Table 1.  The first two rows 
show average total hours of scheduled service and the hours of open work covered by the 
extraboard.  Open work comprises nearly 16 % of each regular scheduled service.  
Extraboard operator platform hours also generally exceed open work hours.  This surplus 
represents extra service (i.e., beyond what is scheduled), as well as the occasional 
practice of dispatching extraboard service to hold at layover points in anticipation of lost 
service due to breakdowns and other causes.  Daily RDO operator hours are fairly small 
in comparison to extraboard operator hours. 
 
 
Table 1 Daily Extraboard Profile by Garage, September 2002 – May 2010 
 
 Center Merlo Powell Total 
Platform Hours of Scheduled Service 2427.9 1313.9 1953.1 5694.9 
     
Platform Hours of Open Work 384.2 205.7 302.8 892.7 
 (% of Scheduled Service Hours) 15.8% 15.7% 15.5% 15.7% 
     
Extraboard Operator Platform Hours 444.7 241.0 335.1 1020.8 
RDO Operator Platform Hours 27.4 14.6 24.0 66.0 
     
Extraboard Operator Report Hours 66.3 36.8 47.4 150.5 
Extraboard Operator Absence Hours 52.2 31.3 47.9 131.4 
 (% of Extraboard Operator Platform Hours) 26.6% 28.3% 28.4% 27.6% 
     
Total Extraboard Pay Hours 590.6 323.7 454.4 1368.7 
 (% of Scheduled Service Hours) 24.3% 24.6% 23.3% 24.0% 
     
Missed Pullout Hours 0.6 0.8 0.6 2.0 
 (% of Scheduled Service Hours) .02% .06% .03% .04% 
     
Extraboard Efficiency 1.54 1.57 1.50 1.54 
 
Extraboard operator report hours represent pay hours when an operator is on duty 
not in platform service.  Such hours can accrue between operators’ assigned report and 
pull-out times, during periods between separate pieces of assigned work, or during times 
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following assigned work when they are held to fill unanticipated openings that may arise.  
Report hours are thus a direct consequence of efficiency losses associated with open 
work uncertainty and the indivisibility of open work pieces (particularly those providing 
peak service).  Absences among extraboard operators are another source of time loss 
from platform service.  The effective platform service time losses from extraboard 
absences and report time are of roughly similar magnitude, and jointly represent about 
28% of the platform hours filled by extraboard operators. 
Collectively, the pay hours for extraboard and RDO operators (including report 
and extraboard absence hours) expended in covering open work amount to 24% of 
regular scheduled service hours.  A small amount of unfilled open work remains when 
the extraboard runs short of available operators.  Such service lost to missed pull-outs 
averages less than an hour per garage per day, or about one trip per garage. 
The final row in Table 1 presents a composite measure of extraboard efficiency, 
defined as the ratio of total extraboard pay hours to the hours of open work (less missed 
pull-out hours).  Thus, for example, Center garage extraboard operations require 1.54 pay 
hours to cover each hour of open work, while Merlo and Powell require 1.57 and 1.50 
hours respectively.  These small differences may reflect garage-related distinctions in the 
runs that must be covered by the extraboard (e.g., more peak trippers needing coverage at 
Center and Merlo), or they may reflect differences in the ability of station agents at the 
garages to piece together open work and effectively match it to operator report times. 
While the information in Table 1 provides a general perspective of the scale of 
extraboard operations, it does not reflect the day-to-day variability in the open work that 
must be covered.  This variability is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots Center garage’s 
daily open work over the 2002-10 period. 
Several observations can be made about the open work plot in Figure 1.  First, the 
coefficient of variation (a standardized measure of variability) for this plot is .31, 
indicating that the standard deviation of daily open work is equal to 31% of the period-
wide average daily amount.  Second, the plot appears to be denser toward the upper end 
of the range of values, indicating that the frequency distribution of open work tends 
toward log normal rather than normal.  Third, a general trend is evident, with open work 
increasing from September 2002 to about September 2006, and subsequently decreasing 
for the remainder of the study period.  Lastly, a small number of large value points can be 
seen for dates associated with severe weather events.  For example, a freezing rain event 
in early January 2004 disrupted scheduled service (and the extraboard) on three 
consecutive days, while heavy snow in late December 2008 had similar consequences on 
four consecutive days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
Figure 1 Center Garage Daily Open Work Hours, September 2002 – May 2010 
 
 
Determining the extent to which open work variability (as illustrated in Figure 1) 
can be systematically predicted is an important part of the extraboard workforce planning 
process, otherwise known as “sizing the extraboard.”  This exercise partly depends on 
determining whether distinct absence patterns exist among regular duty operators.  As 
Strathman et al. (7) have shown, operator absence frequencies vary in fairly predictable 
ways by day of the week, month, year, and garage.  Apart from absences, open work is 
directly affected by any work that remains unassigned in quarterly picks and by work that 
opens up during a quarter due to retirements, quits, and terminations.  Lastly, open work 
is affected by work rules, such as those resulting in pass-ups by regular operators. 
Table 2 shows the results of a regression of daily open work hours on scale, 
temporal, garage, and work rule factors for the 2004/5-10 period.  The results indicate 
that the amount of open work increases at a decreasing rate with the growth of both 
scheduled service and unsigned runs.  Each pass-up by a regular duty operator results in 
his work being sent to the extraboard, increasing the estimated total by about 3.4%, or 
10.3 hours.  Controlling for scale differences among garages, the amount of daily open 
work is estimated to be about 9.3% (27.9 hours) lower at Merlo and 2.0% (5.9 hours) 
lower at Powell than at Central. 
Turning to temporal factors, fewer daily open work hours were estimated in the 
years subsequent to 2004/5, with greatest reductions (relative to 2005) occurring in 2009 
(-4.6%, or 13.9 hours per day per garage) and 2010 (-4.0%, or 12.1 hours per day per 
garage).  Although estimated open work hours in 2008 were less than 2004/5, they were 
1.2% (or 3.6 hours per day per garage) higher than 2007. 
Seasonality in open work hours is evident in the parameter estimates for the 
monthly dummy variables.  Estimated open work hours are lowest during autumn 
months, with a minimum occurring in November.  Relative to November, the estimated 
differential in daily open work hours per garage peaks during the months of June (12.8%, 
or 38.5 hours per day higher than November), July (14.1%, or 42.6 hours), and August 
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(16.9%, or 51.0 hours).  A somewhat smaller peak is also estimated for February (9.3%, 
or 28.0 hours per day higher than November), during the height of the cold and flu 
season.  Regarding the summer peak, it should be noted that most vacation relief service 
is covered through regular duty operator assignments rather than the extraboard.  
However, regular duty operators may concentrate their floating holiday and personal days 
off during this time, which must be covered by the extraboard. 
Open work variability is also evident over the course of the week, with a 
minimum estimated to occur on Sundays.  At the other end, the daily differential relative 
to Sunday is estimated to be greatest on Fridays (14.8%, or 44.7 hours per garage) and 
Saturdays (18.9%, or 56.9 hours per garage).  Lastly daily open work per garage is 
estimated to be 6.9% (or 20.7 hours) lower on holidays, when operators are paid 
overtime.
 11 
 
Table 2 Open Work Model Coefficients 
  (Dependent Variable = ln Open Work Hours) 
 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant 4.2959 91.09 
Scheduled Service Hours .0066 16.52 
Scheduled Service Hours2 -1.12e-07 -13.19 
Open Run Hours .0039 28.67 
Open Run Hours2 -4.72e-06 -8.05 
Regular Duty Operator Pass-ups .0341 16.27 
Center Garage -- -- 
Merlo Garage -.0926 -4.00 
Powell Garage -.0195 -2.12 
Year 2004/5 -- -- 
Year 2006 -.0123 -1.66 
Year 2007 -.0275 -3.59 
Year 2008 -.0156 -2.08 
Year 2009 -.0461 -6.27 
Year 2010 -.0400 -3.67 
January -- -- 
February .0928 8.87 
March .0540 5.26 
April .0865 8.35 
May .0789 7.34 
June .0978 8.91 
July .1122 10.29 
August .1401 12.91 
September .0451 4.11 
October .0410 3.78 
November -.0290 -2.63 
December .0226 2.09 
Sunday -- -- 
Monday .0455 1.53 
Tuesday .0066 0.03 
Wednesday .0456 1.52 
Thursday .0427 1.42 
Friday .1483 4.95 
Saturday .1889 17.98 
Holiday -.0687 -2.53 
   
R2 .84  
Sample Size 5788  
 
 
 12 
 
At its most disaggregate level, the extraboard can be represented in terms of the 
daily allocation of operators’ time.  In filling open work, the extraboard manager seeks to 
maximize the platform time of available extraboard operators while minimizing their 
time on report.  He also seeks to minimize lost service time from missed pull-outs by 
ensuring adequate availability of extraboard operators, supplemented when necessary by 
RDO operators.  Thus, the manager’s responsibility encompasses four basic time 
components: 1) the platform time of extraboard operators; 2) the platform time of RDO 
operators; 3) the report time during which extraboard and RDO operators must be paid 
while they wait to fill an extraboard service assignment; and 4) the lost service time 
associated with missed pull-outs. 
Empirical analysis of the extraboard time management problem can be generally 
represented by the following set of equations: 
 
EO Hours  = f(Open Work Hours, RDO Hours, EO Absence Hours) 
 
RDO Hours  = f(Open Work Hours, EO Hours, EO Absence Hours, EO Pass-ups) 
 
Report Hours  = f(Open Work Hours, EO Hours, RDO Hours, EO Pass-ups) 
 
Missout Hours = f(Open Work Hours, EO Hours, RDO Hours EO Pass-ups, Report  
         Hours), 
where 
 
EO Hours  = daily extraboard operator platform hours per garage; 
 
RDO Hours  = daily extraboard platform hours of RDO operators per garage; 
 
Report Hours  = daily paid report time of operators working the extraboard per garage; 
 
Missout Hours = daily of lost service from missed pull-outs per garage. 
 
Open Work Hours = daily hours of open work per garage; 
 
EO Absence Hours = daily absence hours of extraboard operators per garage; 
 
EO Pass-ups  = daily pass-ups of extraboard-assigned work per garage. 
 
The open work hours variable is specified in each of the equations to capture scale 
effects associated with the platform service hours covered by extraboard and RDO 
operators, along with the hours spent on report and the hours of lost service from missed 
pull-outs.  Selected variables are also specified on both sides of the equation system to 
address trade-offs and simultaneity effects.  This is the case with extraboard and RDO 
operator platform hours, where (for a given amount of open work) an increase in work 
performed by one operator type is expected to offset the amount of work that is 
performed by the other.  Report hours are also specified on both sides of the equations in 
the system.  In one respect, report hours are a consequence of the amount and 
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composition of open work that is filled.  Alternatively, report hours can also serve as a 
buffer against lost service from missed pull-outs by assuring operator availability. 
Pass-ups by regular duty operators have already been examined in terms of their 
effects on the creation of open work.  For extraboard operators, pass-ups can be expected 
to have two consequences.  First, they may result in additional report hours when the 
affected operator must be reassigned to a later piece of open work.  Second, they result in 
an increase in missed pull-out hours when another operators is not available to cover the 
work that has been turned down.  Lastly, absence hours among extraboard operators can 
be expected to have three consequences: 1) they reduce the capacity of the extraboard to 
cover open work; 2) they trigger the need for additional RDO operators; and 3) they 
increase the likelihood of additional lost service from missed pull-outs. 
There are several issues related to estimating the set of equations.  First, there is 
no a prioi knowledge of their appropriate functional form.  This is addressed by testing 
Box-Tidwell exponential transformations of the variables (16), where the limiting 
alternatives are log and linear transformations.  Second, in the case of log 
transformations, zero values are undefined.  Thus, following Dixon et al. (17), where zero 
values exist (e.g., missed pullout hours, pass-ups), they are replaced by the corresponding 
smallest observed values in the sample.  Third, when error covariances among the 
equations are nonzero, estimation efficiency is improved by estimating the equations as a 
seemingly unrelated system (18). 
Iterative Zellner estimates of the coefficients of the four-equation system are 
presented in Table 3.  Testing of Box-Tidwell transformations resulted in a log linear 
specification of all dependent variables, while the outcome was mixed between linear and 
log linear specification of the independent variables depending on the equation.  The 
following discussion interprets the coefficient estimates in terms of the effect of a unit 
change of a given variable at its nominal mean value. 
Beginning with the open work variable, the coefficients indicate that a one hour 
increase is estimated to result in a 1.5 hour increase in extraboard operator platform time, 
a 1.05 hour increase in RDO operator platform time, a 1.5 minute increase in extraboard 
operator report time, and a 42 second increase in missed pull-out time.  The relatively 
smaller marginal effect of open work increases on RDO operators’ platform time likely 
reflects the practice of pre-assigning them to specific straight runs.  Thus, as expected, 
they deliver about an hour of service for each hour of open work.  The much larger 
platform time effect estimated for extraboard operators likely corresponds to the practice 
(discussed earlier in reference to Table 1) of adding service beyond actual open work to 
avoid excessive report time. 
For RDO operators, a one hour increase in their assigned work is estimated to be 
associated with a 1.8 hour reduction in the assigned work of extraboard operators.  It is 
also estimated to result in a 1.5 minute reduction in report time and a 42 second reduction 
in time loss from missed pull-outs.  In contrast, a one hour increase in work performed by 
extraboard operators is estimate to be associated with a 50 minute reduction in work 
performed by RDO operators, a 5.5 minute reduction in report time, and a negligible 
reduction time lost from missed pull-outs. 
The results related to extraboard operator absences reveal an unexpected outcome.  
Here, a one hour increase in extraboard absences is estimated to result in a 36 minute 
increase in the work that they collectively perform.  One possible interpretation of this 
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finding is that absence patterns among extraboard operators are similar to the patterns of 
operators assigned to regular scheduled service.  Thus the amount of open work, and 
work assigned to extraboard operators, would grow with increases in absences of both 
groups.  However, this would also indicate that there would likely be a surplus of 
available extraboard operators on the days when absences among regular duty operators 
(and corresponding open work) are low.  Beyond the effects on worked performed, a one 
hour increase in extraboard absence hours is estimated to result in a 5.4 minute increase 
in work performed by RDO operators and a 29 second increase in time lost from missed 
pull-outs. 
When extraboard operators pass up their assigned work, this results in an 
estimated 2.6 hour increase in work performed by RDO operators.  Extraboard operator 
pass-ups are also estimated to result in a 2.0 hour increase in report time and a 1.1 minute 
increase in time lost from missed pull-outs.  Lastly, a one hour increase in report time 
hours is estimated to result in a 1.45 minute decrease in time lost to missed pull-outs. 
The latter result is consistent with the common extraboard practice of maintaining 
a report time buffer to respond to unexpected instances of open work.  In this context, the 
optimal buffer time is an amount where the marginal cost of report is equal to the 
marginal benefit of passenger waiting time saved per avoided missed trip.  TriMet’s 
system average trip time is about one hour, its average boardings per trip is 33, and its 
average headway is 20 minutes.  Passenger waiting time saved from an averted missed 
trip would thus be thus 660 minutes (33 x 20).  Pratt et al. (19) report a value of waiting 
time equal to the passenger’s wage rate, while the average occupational wage for the 
Portland area is reported to be $22.00 per hour (20).  Thus, the estimated passenger wait 
time benefit from an averted missed trip would be $242 (660 x 22/60).  In contrast, the 
regression results indicate that 41.38 hours of additional report time would be needed to 
reduce missed pull-outs by one trip (60 minutes / 1.45 minutes).  At an average hourly 
compensation rate (wage plus fringe benefits) of $42.00, the associated cost of a trip-
saving report buffer would be $1,738 (42 x 41.38).  Thus the marginal cost of the report 
time buffer exceeds the marginal benefit by more than a factor of seven.  This indicates 
that there has been an over-commitment of report hours by the extraboard with respect to 
minimizing missed pull-outs.  Thus, while reducing report hours would lead to an 
increase in missed pull-outs, the resulting savings in extraboard costs would exceed the 
increases in passenger wait costs. 
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Table 3 Extraboard Time Allocation Model Coefficients* 
  (Asymptotic t-values in parentheses) 
 
Variable Extraboard Service RDO Service Report Hours Missed Pullout Hrs 
Constant 4.7578 
(721.10) 
-6.1350 
(-10.14) 
3.8900 
(28.81) 
0.3287 
(1.49) 
Open Work Hours .0034 
(144.46) 
-- -- .0146 
(22.59) 
ln Open Work Hours -- 12.9488 
(63.39) 
-.1463 
(-5.16) 
-- 
Regular Duty Operator Overtime Hours -.0054 
(-52.45) 
-- -- -.0178 
(-13.34) 
ln Regular Duty Operator Overtime Hours -- -- -.0314 
(-19.08) 
-- 
Extraboard Operator Absence Hours .0017 
(14.56) 
.0036 
(1.91) 
-- .0100 
(7.70) 
Extraboard Operator Platform Hours -- -- .0018 
(21.60) 
-- 
ln Extraboard Operator Platform Hours -- -11.5486 
(-58.56) 
-- -.0073 
(-13.05) 
Extraboard Operator Pass-ups -- .1073 
(6.86) 
.0385 
(17.15) 
-- 
ln Extraboard Operator Pass-ups -- -- -- .1134 
(5.58) 
ln Extraboard Operator Report Hours -- -- -- -1.5482 
(-24.08) 
     
Asymptotic R2 .84 .34 .39 .22 
Sample Size 5788 5788 5788 5788 
*  The dependent variables for the four equations are as follows: 
 Extraboard Service Equation: ln Extraboard Operator Platform Hours 
 RDO Service Equation:  ln Regular Duty Operator Overtime Hours 
 Report Hours Equation:  ln Extraboard Operator Report Hours 
 Missed Pullout Hrs Equation: ln Missed Pullout Hours 
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It should be noted that, as defined above, the customer wait time benefit 
represents the direct consequence of avoiding a missed trip.  Other potentially relevant 
customer benefits are not captured in the trade-off examined above.  For example, if a 
transfer is subsequently missed due to lost service, additional wait time will accrue.  
Also, a penalty (sometimes monetary) is incurred when customers are delayed relative to 
their planned arrival times (21).  Lastly, missed pull-outs degrade service reliability, an 
important attribute that in the attraction and retention of customers (22, 23).  Fully 
accounting for these factors would increase total customer benefits of avoiding a missed 
trip and thus narrow the wait benefit/report cost difference obtained above.  While these 
consequences cannot be documented in the present study, they should be considered in 
future work. 
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Conclusions	
 
This report has examined the performance of bus extraboard operations at TriMet.  
At the system level, the extraboard must be sufficiently staffed to cover open work that, 
on average, amounts to 16% of TriMet’s scheduled service.  In this study, statistical 
analysis of open work patterns found seasonal variability that generally corresponds to 
the variability of regular operator absences found in previous work (7).  Seasonality can 
be fairly readily accounted for in extraboard work force planning.  Open work patterns 
were also found to vary systematically across days of the week, which can be tactically 
managed.  Statistical analysis of the extraboard at the operational level identified several 
work and assignment practices that diminish resource efficiency, including assigned work 
pass-ups and a tendency toward maintaining excess report time.  These findings are 
discussed further below.  It should be recognized that the following conclusions reflect 
operating conditions and work rules that exist in one case study property.  Although these 
conditions and rules are likely to be fairly common in the transit industry, there is 
presently little systematic knowledge of specific work provisions contained in collective 
bargaining agreements across the industry. 
The overall size of the extraboard represents a substantial commitment of agency 
resources to maintaining scheduled service.  It thus follows that the greatest opportunity 
for improving the general efficiency of the extraboard would be through achieving gains 
in the attendance rate of regular duty operators.  Considerable attention was given to this 
issue in the 1980s and 1990s in response to a trend increase in absenteeism that occurred 
during that time (24, 25, 26, 27).  Then, researchers cautiously encouraged the use of 
economic incentives (through gain sharing programs) to improve attendance.  Given that 
a one-hour improvement in regular operator attendance in the present study would release 
an additional 1.4 extraboard operator hours, there would be an opportunity for substantial 
monetary gains by both operators and TriMet under a gain sharing arrangement. 
While the seasonal variations in open work can be reasonably managed, varying 
daily patterns are more problematic.  Although gain sharing could be structured to 
address the days where open work tends to be greatest, the problem could also be 
partially mitigated by changes in practice.  For example, the practice of granting personal 
days off on Fridays, Saturdays, or Mondays (which are typically lower attendance days 
among regular duty operators) could be discouraged, as could the practice of scheduling 
in-service training for operators on Fridays or Mondays. 
Among the factors reducing extraboard efficiency is the process of piecing 
together open work associated with peak period tripper service and splits.  This process 
would become more efficient if part time operators were allowed to sign onto the 
extraboard.  This option has been traditionally resisted in part due to the perception that 
part time status is an initial, transitional step of recently hired operators on their way to 
full time status.  While this perception is valid for most part time operators, it does not 
hold universally.  About 20% of TriMet’s part time operators pass on the opportunity to 
move to full time status, signaling that this represents their preferred level of 
employment.  Thus they are not always junior to full time operators in terms of seniority, 
and allowing their entry would not necessarily undermine the traditional privilege of 
extraboard sign-up being reserved for full time operators. 
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Operators may pass up a piece of assigned work when its report time is less than 
nine hours from the previous day’s sign out.  Pass-ups by regular duty operators were 
found to add to the volume of open work, while pass-ups by extraboard operators 
contributed to increases in both report time and time lost from missed pull-outs.  Regular 
operator pass-ups occur as a consequence of the work selection process or as a result of 
trading their assigned work with another operator.  Thus, the quarterly work selection 
process should discourage operators from piecing runs together that include pass-up 
situations.  Trades into pass-up situations should also be discouraged. 
Pass-ups among extraboard operators can arise as a consequence of the daily 
progression of the red line or as a result of trades.  Use of the red line at TriMet can be 
traced to a time when pay was not guaranteed.  The red line thus ensured a fair 
distribution of the open work that became available.  Presently, however, extraboard 
operators are guaranteed full pay.  A second function of the red line is to ensure that no 
operator is “locked into” an undesirable report time or piece of work throughout the sign-
up.  Thus, it appears that the red line has outlived its “fair compensation” rationale, and it 
is worth assessing how strongly extraboard operators support its use in “mixing up” work 
assignments.  As with regular duty operators, trades into pass-up situations should be 
discouraged within the extraboard. 
Analysis has found that report time provides a buffer against missed pullouts.  In 
the present case, however, the costs associated with dedicating report time toward this 
objective are considerably greater than the direct benefits that passengers obtain through 
reduced wait times.  This leads to the conclusion that there is excess report time in 
extraboard operations.  Reducing report time would yield a net benefit to both TriMet and 
its customers if the resulting savings were reinvested in additional scheduled service.  
However, such action would also marginally increase time lost to missed pull-outs, a key 
performance outcome that is closely watched by senior management.  In their efforts to 
drive missed pull-outs to very low levels, operations managers have generally lacked 
corresponding information on the cost of “missed pull-out insurance” represented in 
excess report time.  Similarly, while extraboard managers are held accountable for missed 
pull-outs, they are less likely to be called to account for a few additional report hours.  
With access to the relevant cost and benefit information, both operations and extraboard 
managers will be in a better position to identify a missed pull-out target that represents 
the most efficient use of agency and customer resources. 
A final point relates to the process through which changes in practice are 
implemented.  In this case, elimination of the red line and limiting work trading activity 
are changes that can only be achieved at the bargaining table through contract 
negotiations.  Transit executives often lack information on the cost impacts of such work 
rules and, as a consequence, tend to focus bargaining attention elsewhere.  However, as 
this paper shows in the context of extraboard operations, selected work rules can have 
non-trivial performance and cost consequences, and deserve more careful examination. 
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